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Abstract
While polemics is still shadowing the internationally accepted definition, the 
word “Terrorism” becomes more controversial when it is paralleled with “Islam”. 
The Islamic Terrorism discourse is more likely to be an elusive concept if not a 
Fata Morgana. Its very existence appears as a real entity but its form can hard-
ly be described. It would be always be problematic to posterize such a terrible 
notion as “terrorism” and put it side by side with a noble concept as in “Islam”. 
The fact, however, shows that the two-word has been widely discussed in global 
arena. “Islamic Terrorism” has become a trending topic in global politics and 
academic discourses in the first decade of the millennium.
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INTRODUCTION
The widely-held discussions on terrorism in the wake of the September 11, 
2001  event  in the United States  have almost certainly  touched the debate 
on Islam  and/or at least Muslims.  This  is highly  ironic.  Terrorism  which 
means  violent acts  with a political goal  carried out by creating a 
terrifying situation  is labeled  on  Islam,  a religion  which literally 
means gentleness,  submission, and  leading to  the purpose of  the 
peace  of the world  and  life afterwards.  This irony  also  continues as  the 
word ‘Islamic  terrorism’  is repeatedly mentioned  but  merely refers 
to  a  common sense  where there is no  definite  definition that describes  its 
specifications.  Assumptions  that arise  and become  a  description when  the 
term ‘Islamic terrorism’ is used generally to refer to a concept as defined by 
Wikipedia as follows: “a form of religious terrorism committed by extremists 
of Islam mostly for the religious beliefs and sometimes on achieving varying 
political ends again in the name of religion”
Violence with religious motives are in fact not something new and certainly 
not  exclusively  practiced by  adherents of  a  particular  religion.  History 
has recorded a long documentation of violence against other groups on the basis 
of conviction. However, which actions are regarded as terrorism and which are 
not is a big problem because they have political consequences and have implications 
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for moral  rhetoric. Northern  Ireland Liberation Army  (IRA)  viewed their 
Group as doing sacred religious struggle against the domination of the British 
rule in the territory. Timothy Mc Veigh did not feel sorry at all as he brought 
down the FBI building with hundreds of people killed inside because he looked 
at the action as a struggle to stop the ‘formal’ government oppression against a 
religious group which he was affiliated. The Aum Shinrikyo sect also argued 
that they had done  a  ‘great’  sacred  job  when  fighting  the  Government 
of Japan by releasing nerve gas killer «Nerin» in a subway station in Tokyo. No 
matter what sacral purpose they had for their actions, the label ‘terrorist ‘ comes 
across anybody’s mind when their names are mentioned.
Major mainstream influential powers in the world and the policy direction 
of the intense media campaign in the publicity have a dominant role in 
determining to which group the label of terrorism is pinned. The geo-political 
discourse situation and international policy also have the same contribution 
involved. William F. Shugart II noted that since the end of the Second World 
War there are three categories of violent actions which have been labeled 
terrorism based on the type of background and purpose. First, shortly after 
the end of World War II, violent actions that had implications for terror 
generally grounded by separatism and the purpose of the formation of the 
new sovereign state. The nature of his movement was limited and its scope 
was domestic. Second, starting around the 1960s until the fall of the Berlin 
wall in 1989, terrorism began to take shape as the movement of a populist 
left-wing which was inspired by the view of anti-Western liberalism and anti-
Americanism to be more specific. The context of the cold war between the 
U.S.-led Western bloc and the Soviet-led Eastern bloc, added color to violent 
terror actions in this period, in which terrorism was seen as the Eastern bloc 
with sporadic attacks using extreme factions to attack the Western interests in 
different parts of the world. This is the phase that is often seen as the starting 
point of the ‘globalization’ of terrorism. Third, the final evolution of the wave 
of terrorism incarnated in the form of religion-based violence, in particular 
Islam. This form of terrorism is the ultimate evolution of the previous series 
and has been transformed in such a way that it became more brutal and 
terrifying. Why is the third wave of the form of terrorism often associated 
with Islam and described as “so terrifying”?
Further description of the classification put forward by Shugart II indicated 
that: first,  terrorism  is often interpreted  simply  as  violent actions  that 
create  a terrifying atmosphere  to get attention from many 
people.  Second,  terrorism  almost has always  been linked to  anti status 
quo  movements  that oppose  the legitimate power. Third, the  trend  of 
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world  political  discourse  is instrumental  in  determining  the realm where   
terrorism  issues are centralized  . The end of  the cold war  that was marked 
by  the collapse of  the Soviet Union  immediately  ended the  main focus  of 
global  political discourse  surrounding the  conflict between the  West and 
the East, which has lasted for almost three decades. In the middle of the race, 
the news surrounding the actions of violence involving Muslims dominated 
the  international media  publicity. Resistance  fought  by some  Muslim 
groups against the oppression of the rulers in a territory that received support of 
moral sympathy, funds, even soldiers and arms from other Muslim groups is 
seen as  a  phenomenon  of a new  trans-national violent  conflict, especially 
when the excess of political violence then targeted vital interests of the West 
and led to a large number of casualties. Victims of violence involving Muslim 
groups  throughout  the 1990s  reached  three  times of the  total number 
of victims of terrorism in the four decades before.
Analysts  further  indicated  that the  roots  of  political  violence  in this 
new phenomenon is inspired by the rise of two Muslim groups who through-
out history  have always opposed each other;  The  Iran  revolution   initiated 
by the  Shi’a  and  the success of  the  Mujahideen, who were   Sunni  majority
,  in  expelling  the Soviets  from  Afghanistan.  The motives  of fighting  in the 
name of Islam with the sacred goal by Islamist groups is seen as a more ef-
fective  way  than  revolutionary  resistance.  These conclusions  can  illus-
trate  why  terrorism  discourse  then  evolved from  political  violence to  reli-
gion-based violence and then put Islam as a focus of discourse as a leading 
role in terror and terrorism.
In a number  of influential  sources  which will be discussed  in  the 
next  section, the construction of  the narrative  discourse  of terrorism   -
i nvolving  Muslims  even  tends to be overstated.  Some of  the 
new  terms like  terrorism  or  the   essentialist  terrorism emerged  with 
a  euphemistic  language that  actually  has sinister implication in  the 
meaning. A series of violent acts that are seen as terrorism with Islam as the 
main culprit is often referred to by the term the ‘new’ terrorism’ because it is 
different from conventional terrorism with only limited political aims. Islamic 
terrorism is oriented  toward total destruction  with  a lot of casualties  and 
losses  on the side of  the target and  is seen as  a  justification 
of dogmatic basis. The Muslim perpetrators were often viewed as the essentialist 
terrorists because of their violent fanatical fundamentalist basis, and they are fond 
of massacring people whom they consider  infidels. Therefore,  the approach 
to counter-terrorism against it must also employ new methods, and conventional 
criminal  law  is not sufficient as  the solution.  To understand  completely 
[  216  ]
AL ALBAB - Borneo Journal of Religious Studies (BJRS) Volume 3 Number 2 December 2014
about  how  Islamic  terrorism  discourse  is formed  and its construction 
characteristics shaped can be traced through the following discussion.
THE GENEALOGY OF DISCOURSE OF ISLAMIC TERRORISM
The genealogical discourse approach  is based on  the fact that a  text always 
refers to  other  texts  that also  rely on  texts  that have been  there 
before.  Thus,  the discourse  forms a  way of looking  through  a mechanism 
that  involves the use of linguistic  resources and system arrangement of  the 
existing  culture  in interpreting  a particular social  phenomenon.  The 
use of  this  genealogical  approach  here  is expected to  help  to 
understand how  «knowledge»  formed today is formulated  through a 
process of  naturalization  which took place  in the  span  of time, space 
and  discursive  practices.  Many  aspects of the  details  that could be 
used to  explain  the origin of  the  construction of  the discourse  of 
Islamic terrorism. However, there are at least three common explanations that 
could describe how the concept of Islamic terrorism that is understood and used 
in its present form.
First and foremost is  that the  narrative  discourse of  ‘Islamic terrorism’ 
which is under discussion right now  is based  on assumptions, theories 
and  concepts  of knowledge which had been  established  in  the field of 
study  scope  of terrorism.  Although  this narrative  discourse  is thriving 
and  became the focus of  an independent  academic study  and was 
recognized  after the  terrorist attacks of 11  September,  the concept 
of ‘Islamic terrorism’  seems to have emerged  since two  previous  few 
decades  ago.  Its origin stems from  the concept of  ‘religious  terrorism’.  The 
concept most widely  used  and  cited  by  influential literature  afterward  is 
‘religious  terrorism’  which was developed  by  David  Rapoport  in  his 
paper entitled «Fear and Trembling: Terrorism in Three Religious Traditions”, 
published in the journal of the American Political Science Review in 1984. From 
the work of Rapoport, a number of core texts were written by other influential 
academics, creating  a reputation as  a  major  source of  reference  in 
the study of  ‹  Islamic terrorism  ‘.  Concepts,  narrative  construction  as 
well  as  the labels that  became the core  of  discourse  analysis  developed 
by  these past  references  then gained  a strong authority  and  were very 
influential politically. The factor that helped to shape it was a close tripartite 
network connection between academics specializing in terrorism with a circle of 
power  holders of  policies that  are also supported  by  senior  journalists  in 
several influential international media.
Second, the core focus of the study which became central in the discourse of 
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Islamic terrorism as well as the pattern of narration and labels used in it was 
derived from a long tradition in the orientalist studies of the Middle East and 
religious studies in the Arab culture. The literature of the orientalist studies 
was growing rapidly following the tumultuous events in the Middle East in the 
1970s and 1980s such as the massacre of the 1972 Olympic Games in Munich, 
the world oil crisis in 1973, the U.S. Embassy hostage-taking crisis in Iran that 
accompanied the revolution in 1979, the case of Salman Rushdie, as well as 
terrorism cases involving kidnapping and piracy throughout the 1980s. This 
type of trend in the orientalist studies then became more intense with the 
9/11 attacks and the war campaign against terrorism. One of most dominant 
literatures that affects the study of international relations with the nuances of 
the orientalist viewpoint was the work of Samuel Huntington entitled “the 
Clash of Civilization?”. The essay written in 1993 and the title quoted from the 
work of Bernard Lewis became an important antecedent and was reproduced 
in many other works in Islamic terrorism discourse circulating nowadays. In 
addition, figures like Bernard Lewis, Noah Feldman, Raphael Patai and other 
orientalist experts in the Middle East studies more often shared ideas with 
other experts in the field of terrorism and became major advisory and expert 
staff for the U.S. Government in the formulation of the action against terror. 
This became the catalyst for the transmission of orientalist viewpoint that 
subsequently shaped the discourse of Islamic terrorism in the political policy 
process.
Third,  many  Islamic  terrorism  discourses  refer to  a long tradition  of 
cultural stereotypes  and  representations of  one-sided  media  that 
often portray Islam and Muslims as the ‘enemy’. In describing the Muslims, the 
mainstream media  usually  tend to use a framework  with a focus 
on violence, threats, extremism, fanaticism and terrorism, although there is 
also some visual tradition of the orientalists in which Muslims are portrayed 
as  exotic and  mysterious.  Imaging  representation of  cultural  forms like 
this has survived  for so long and embedded so strongly. The reason is  that 
the viewpoint reflects the socio-culture of the West’s fear and anxiety that the 
other side which is oriental is often stereotyped, and this has been going on since 
the imperial period. Many also argued that the dichotomous viewpoints of 
the orientalists  of us  and  they  has intentionally been preserved  as a form 
of imperialism in a new style.
In addition to the three primary discursive traditions above, especially after 
the event of 9/11, the discourse of ‘Islamic terrorism’ also inherited the concepts 
and  terms that  had been used in  narratives  of cultural  discourse of  earlier 
global politics.  Idioms  such as ‘good war’  for example  is a discourse which 
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was often used by the Western allies in the fight against fascism in World War 
II and the cold war. Likewise, with other terms such as ‘civilized vs. barbaric 
war’, ‘rogue states’, ‘enemy within’,weapons of mass destruction, the  eternal 
battle between good and evil is a series of old cultural narrative that is now the 
central exposure that decorate the discourse of the so-called ‘Islamic terrorism’.
THE CORE ELEMENTS OF THE NARRATIVE DISCOURSE OF 
‘ISLAMIC TERRORISM’
The narrative discourse of Islamic terrorism is built on a foundation that in-
cludes the  main concepts  in the form of  assumptions  and  labeling  that are 
formed  of a series  of terminology.  The majority of  Islamic  terrorism  dis-
course  quoted the  major  terms  such as ‘Islamic world’,  ‘the West’,  ‘the rise 
of Islam’,  ‘political Islam’,  ‘Islamism’,  ‘extremism’,  ‘radicalism’, ‘fundamental-
ism’, ‘religious terrorism’, ‘Jihad’, ‘Wahhabi’, ‘Salafi’, ‘militant’, ‘moderate’, ‘glob-
al Jihad movement’, ‘al-Qaeda’, and of course, the ‘Islamic terrorism’. Unfortu-
nately, however, the above terms in the textual use often refer to the unclear 
intent. The definition often gives rise to misinterpretation and even is filled 
with stereotypical cultural bias. 
In addition, a series of labels and the terms above are generally put together in 
such a way and then presented in a dramatic binary opposition. The term ‘Is-
lamic world’ for example is narrated in opposition to the culture of ‹West›. Sim-
ilarly, other concepts such as extremist vs moderate, totalitarian vs democrat-
ic, secular versus religious, civilized vs barbaric. Extreme polarization within 
the  narrative  discourse  seems to be  intentionally enabled  to build  a frame 
of  ‹Islamic terrorism’ and  ‘extremists’,  as  the real-life  entities in the over-
all  story and  stands  opposite the  other entities  such as ‹peaceful society’ 
‘democratic State’ or ‘moderate Muslims’ for example. More importantly, the 
construction  in  this  discourse  also  often  negates  another identity  which  is 
also so prominent on a narrative central actor’s character into the spotlight. The 
application of  labels such as  ‘terrorists’,  ‘fundamentalist’ and  ‘extremist’  to 
groups such as Hamas and Hezbollah, for example, with the immediate ob-
scurity of the fact that they basically play the role of political parties, social 
welfare,  social welfare activists,  charitable  aid agencies, educational institu-
tions, guerrilla forces and so on. In the narrative of Islamic terrorism, these 
groups are often simplified as the enemy of Western society.
This discourse also often includes a series of qualifications carefully designe
d to limit the scope of the label, the narrative and the assumption that in the 
context of political or other cultures would be considered degrading. There-
fore, it is commonly found in the text of the studies on ‹Islamic terrorism ‘ 
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which began with  statements such as: “the majority of Muslims are actual-
ly  practicing  peaceful  and inclusive  religion  [...]”,  “[unfortunately]..  Islam-
ic terrorists are inspired by the teachings that deviate from Islam and their sa-
cred  campaign of violence  through the choice  of verses extracted from 
the Qur’an”. But then, after that statement, almost the whole expression of the 
discourse directly discredits Islam and other religious aspects associated with-
in it. Although the texts about the discourse of Islamic terrorism so broad-
ly spread and easily found,  the entire discourse is nonetheless filled with bi-
ased materials (prejudice) against Islam.
THE MAIN CHARACTERISTICS OF THE NARRATIVE 
 DISCOURSE OF ISLAMICTERRORISM
Each discourse is never uniform, coherent or consistent. Each has fragile  lim-
itations (debatable) and there are many exceptions, inconsistencies and contra-
dictions between one text and another engaged in such discourse. ‘Islamic ter-
rorism experts ‘ generally presented their discourse in phrases that shaped the 
arguments  either  in the form of support  or  opposition.  They  contributed 
with  a different  methodology background  in describing  the main  charac-
teristics  of  narrative  discourse  which  they get into.  In some cases,  some of 
them even seemed to disregard the constraints of an actual narrative charac-
ter they are building when focusing on the argument for opposition. However, 
if their works are put together in one clump of discourse then it will gener-
ate  a  narrative  construction  with some  typical  specifications  and functions 
as  a  concept  jointly  understood  within the context of  culture and  poli-
tics. Through  such a  chronology of  the main  characteristics  of the  narra-
tive, ‹Islamic terrorism’ is formed, and the illustration of the assumptions, la-
bel, as well as its central narrative can be seen clearly in some parts.
The most important central axis of the whole discourse of Islamic terrorism 
comes from a major assumption that violence being a fundamental factor in 
the cause of terrorism is inherent in the teachings of Islam. The reason of this 
assumption is that unlike Christianity, which has strict lines of distinction be-
tween the ‘Church’ (religion) and State (politics), Islam does not recognize the 
distinction between the sacred and the profane, between religion and politics, 
and therefore still perpetuates the teachings of war in the name of religion (re-
ligious war). In the majority of the texts, Islam is always described as a religion 
which regulates both private and social life so as to impact in the formation of 
the characteristics of the political life of its followers. These concepts are often 
used as the main pillar of the argument in the dominant contribution of Islam 
with regards to religious violence. Walter Laquer –one of the most respected 
figures in the study of terrorism for example– mentioned that although no 
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Arab or Muslim monopoly term in the field of religious fanaticism, the fre-
quency of acts of terrorism involving Muslims and Arabs are so striking, and 
meanwhile the discussions surrounding the religious backgrounds of terror-
ism may not be limited just by highlighting radical Islam. “It cannot be denied 
that, in fact, Muslim countries occupy the top position in the spotlight,” he 
said. With the same tone, Barak Mendelsohn said that the extremists who 
wanted to impose religious law as the basis for the State exist in all religions, 
but religious terrorism just seemed so real in Muslim societies.
Such open expressions with similar narration are scattered in the media. In 
addition to the rude statement of Samuel Huntington who mentioned that “Is-
lam has a bloody borders”, an awful lot of exposure to other natural inher-
ent relationship to associate Islam with political violence on the basis of ‘facts’ 
that Islam does not separate religion and politics. One of the publications of 
a leading  counter-terrorism think-tank,  for example,  viewed that in  the Is-
lamic world political violence committed by Muslim groups cannot be sepa-
rated from the basics of religious belief. Actions of terrorism that happened 
in parts of the Arab and Muslim world are inborn nature of Islam itself.
The other major characteristics which are directly related to the narrative 
above are a view of the actions of terrorism that has always been related to or 
arise and is inspired by the form of the practice or interpretation of Islamic 
fundamentalism and extremism. Some texts for study of terrorism even al-
ways build axiomatic link between terrorism and actions carried out by Isla-
mist groups, Salafi or Wahabi. Magnus Ranstorp in his work generalized that 
every Islamist movement has an underbow of activities in the world of terror 
without detailing specific qualifications in the categorization. Reuven Paz of 
the International Policy Institute for Counter-Terrorism (ICT) wrote about 
the ‘culture of terrorism in Islam’ and ideology, doctrine and activities of vio-
lence in Islam. Paz indicated that violent actions are culturally and firmly em-
bedded in Islamism. So is the case with Marc Sageman who is also one of the 
prominent experts in the study of terrorism. By taking the focus of studies on 
global Salafi Jihad movement and ‘terrorist group’ of the Salafi group affiliated 
with al Qaeda, concluded that the ideology of Salafi is an inspiration from the 
determination of the mission form, goal setting, and supervising the tactics of 
terror actions they carry out. Furthermore, according to Sageman, Al-Qaeda 
is not only limited to terrorist organization involved in the political sphere 
but also in the socio-religious revivalist movement. The connection between 
the concepts of terrorism and extremism found in the discursive formation 
above subsequently forms a structure of ‘knowledge’ that resonates in the pub-
lic realm that Islam by nature is very violent and terroristic.
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In addition to the explicit labeling way like the explanation above, there is also a 
relationship between narrative characterization of Islam and violence and ter-
rorism wrapped in a more implicit way. Such characterization is implied in 
any representation that  lays out  the roots of terrorism  in Islam. The narra-
tives generally detail some of the core concepts that come from the teachings 
of  Islam such as  Jihad, Sharia, Shahada, Dar al-Islam, Dar al-Harb, Jaahili-
yya,  Ummah,  Takfir,  and so forth,  as well as how  Muslim  scholars  like Say
yid  Qutb  or  Muhammad  Ibn  Wahhab interpreted it.  With  such  narrative, 
a  common assumption emerged that  groups like  al-Qaeda  or  other Islam-
ic radical movements are basically recognized theologically as the followers of 
Islam among Muslims. And therefore, the ideology and the doctrines that in-
spired actions of terrorism are part of mainstream Islam as a whole. The char-
acteristics of this kind of discourse, intentionally or not, leading to a strength-
ening of the perception that real violence or terrorism really appears from or 
even stems from the teachings and practices of Islam. Then the conclusion in 
the end is that  Islam is in fact  the core of  the threat of terrorism, or  in the 
language of  one of the  observers  of the Foreign Policy  Center:  “The  Jihad-
ist can be found in almost any place that Muslim communities can be found”.
Another characteristic of  the core narrative of  this discourse  is that the ac-
tions of  ‘Islamic terrorism’ are  driven by  religious  motives  or  sacred  rea-
sons than considerations of a political or ideological motivation. A lot of the 
goals expressed by the ‘Islamic terrorists’ are generally centered around com-
bating and destroying Israel and Western dominance, undermine the authority 
of the regime in the Muslim lands, the return of Muslims to the Islamic teach-
ings  which  form  true and  pure and  re-establish  a Caliphate of  Islamic  or-
der. Shaul Mishaal and Maoz Rosenthal, for example, argued that the  long-
term goals of the Islamic extremists are to change social and political order in 
countries that  the majority  of the population are  Muslim  by  an Islamic 
State governed by Islamic law. David Cook even went so far as to declare that a 
radical Islamic Group has a large main goal of uniting all Muslims in an Islam-
ic State and subsequently lead them to dominate the world.
Because  the goal  was strongly influenced by  the sacred  motivation, Islam-
ic terrorism in subsequent discursive formulations tends to be identified as an 
anti-modern,  anti-secular and anti-democratic movement.  Ranstorp  insist-
ed that concerns over infiltration of secularization from foreign parties are a 
catalyst  for the  emergence of actions of religious  terrorism.  These  radi-
cal groups, Ranstorp said, are driven by the background of ‘xenophobic’ moti-
vation against everything that comes from foreign or secular parties as well as 
a strong  sense of  rejection  of  Western culture.  Similarly, Benjamin  Barber 
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also argued that the ‘army’ of Jihad despised modernity secular, scientific, ra-
tional and commercial culture that they think are derived from European Re
naissance culture. In fact there are also texts in narrative discourse which de-
scribe it with a very rude expression. Ayla Schbley  in a  leading  journal en-
titled Studies  in Conflict and Terrorism  stated that public disapproval of the 
democratization and modernity  in the  Islamic world is due to the fact that 
Muslims tend to continue to engage in violence because for them the concept 
of nation-states and democracy looks like pork and its rind.
Moreover,  ‘  Islamic terrorism  ‘ is also  often  narrated  as  actions  which are 
based  by a sense  of deep  hatred  against  America and  the West.  This  sense 
of hatred is caused by anger and a sense of  impotence in the course of his-
tory where Muslims once ruled the world in one stretch of time then experi-
enced a failure in economic development and modernization, the defeat in the 
conflict against the forces when dealing with Israel, and their inability to re-
duce the pace of the process of globalization and secularization. Takeyh and 
Gvosdev indicated that a radical Islamism is an ideology of hate and terror aim-
ing to undermine the existing order. While Bernard Lewis argued that Islamic 
fundamentalism has inspired direction and format of the movement from the 
condition of despair, resentment, and anger of the Muslims before the power 
that has diminished their pride and traditional values. This narrative then leads 
to an assumption which concludes that among the main goals of the mission 
of Jihad is to restore the pride and glory of the Muslims in the presence of the 
New World Order that is sponsored by the West.
One of the characters in the narrative that may be the most important part 
of  this discourse  is  the assumption that  ‘Islamic terrorism’  is the  greatest 
threat to Western security and stability.  In a variety of  texts, one can easily 
find expressions and impression that ‘Islamic terrorism’ has always been one 
of the most significant threats to the national security of Western Nations in 
general and the  United States in particular.  Quoting the  main  characteris-
tics with narrative ‘ Islamic terrorism ‘, Sageman explained the shape of such 
threats as follows:
“A new type of terrorism threatens the world, driven by networks of fanatics 
determined to inflict maximum civilian and economic damages on distant 
targets in pursuit of their extremist goals. Armed with modern technology, 
they are capable of devastating destruction worldwide. They target the West, 
but their operations mercilessly slaughter thousands of people . . .”
The form of  assumption  derived from  this narrative  seems to serve as the 
basis for many of the  underlying  policies issued by  the U.S.  Government. 
They tend to believe that ‘Islamic  terrorism’ has  enormous  potential  that 
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threatens the sustainability of the cultural order of Western democracy and 
the overall view of its life. They also seem so sure that ‘Islamic terrorism’ re-
ceives support from ‘dangerous’ rogue regimes and the sympathy of millions 
of good Muslims who live in Muslim countries as well as in the West. Dan-
iel  Pipes,  for example,  indicated  that the enemy  of the West  is the  mili-
tant Muslims with a number reaching 10-15 percent of the total population 
of Muslims in the world totaling more than 1 billion adherents. This means that 
the US  has  a  potential threat  of attack from  about 100-150 million  Mus-
lim militants who may become its enemies. Pipes then assumed that although 
no poll survey conducted in the middle of the Muslim community popula-
tion, he believed at least half of the total, or about 500 million Muslims would 
be more sympathetic to Osama bin Laden and the Taliban than to  the U.S. 
Government.
Narrative discourse regarding the threat of ‘Islamic terrorism’ is also closely 
related to the discourse surrounding the ‘mythology’ of al-Qaeda terrorist net-
work and the group called ‹Afghan› Jihad. Generally, this narrative confirms 
the  existence  of the thousands  of  volunteers  who  have experienced  a  mili-
tant  Jihad  training  and  combat in the  war against  the Soviet Union  in  Af-
ghanistan  and  they are now  linked  in  a  global network.  Jessica  Stern  in-
dicated  that  at the time of  the September 11,  2001  tragedy  there were at 
least 70,000 to 110,000 Muslim radicals who have graduated from the al-Qae-
da  training camp.  Another  analysis  calculated the chances of  their num-
ber was between 35,000 and 50,000 worldwide, all of whom were operatives, 
some  were moving  independently,  mostly in  standby position,  and  ready 
to commit holy war against the West. They also get support from six million 
more who are scattered in other radical Muslim countries in all corners of the 
world.  The  description  formed by  this  discursive  construction  model  is a 
concept that Islam and the Muslim world is a ‘direct threat’ and dangerous for 
the existence of the West.
The narrative  of potential  threat of  ‘Islamic terrorism’  above  borrows con-
cepts, perspectives and labeling that come from the field of study of previous 
general terrorism, especially ideas that illustrate that the world is facing a new 
kind of  ‘terrorism’.  The theories  of the  ‘New  Terrorism’  mentioned spe-
cial  specifications of this  new kind of  terrorism  that is  identified  with  the 
violent actions  that are  rampant  in the Muslim world.  Characteristics  that 
are often expressed are among others domination of background of hate mo-
tivation, fanaticism and extremism with a political  ideology;  a new  type of 
terrorism is inspired by the teachings of the religion and is determined to in-
flict  mass  casualties  among civilians;  the culprit  is ready  to sacrifice  them-
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selves in an action for assault or murder, and they are also ready to use weap-
ons of mass destruction. Finally, the picture that emerges is the world facing a 
more cruel form of terrorism. Ranstorp said that the violent actions commit-
ted by religious extremists know no boundary of humanity because they do 
not recognize moral  constraints  in using violence.  Stern  also  argued that 
this terrorist group is more dangerous than the secular one, and the possibility 
that they use weapons of mass destruction is far more open.
The important narrative form subsequently constructed is that since ‹Islamic 
terrorism› is full of religious bigotry,  irrational and deadly, then there is no 
reason to open the space for negotiations, let alone compromise for peace. The 
only way to deal with the phenomenon of  ‘Islamic terrorism’ is the method 
of  eradication and  prevention  and enforced by  other  counter-terrorist ac-
tions. One of the distinctive expressions representing this narrative is expressed 
by Daniel Byman, «the  wide coverage of the issue of the terrorist group’s agen-
da such as those of al-Qaeda that are trying to spread hatred and Jihad propa-
ganda as the only way out, then making peace with them is difficult in theo-
ry and impossible in practice”. With similar patterns, Barber asserted that the 
purpose of  the  Islamic terrorist  group  that  absolutely  cannot be  negotiat-
ed is rationalized. According to him, the terrorists never give any option and 
therefore  have to be  countered  and  eradicated  up  to its roots.  Expressions 
that are often used in  this discourse  in the political  landscape are reflected 
in the statement of Tony Blair. He stated that “You just need to pay attention 
to the demands of al-Qaeda to understand that you will never be able to com-
promise with them. The only choice you will be defeated by them or move to 
defeat them”
Other elements of the narrative the ‘New Terrorism› used in the construction of 
the discourse  of ‘Islamic  terrorism’  is a description  that  is different from 
the traditional terrorist groups that have an organized hierarchy, the ‘Islam-
ic terrorists’  have  a decentralized  structure  with  a flexible  network.  Ana-
lysts from the RAND Corporation argued that a new breed of the actions of 
terrorism has evolved towards a form net-war. Islamic fundamentalist orga-
nizations such as Hamas and the network under the leadership of Osama bin 
Laden are composed of many inter-connected sub-groups. They form semi-
independent  cells  that do not have  a single  command  hierarchy.  Cha-
tham  House also  released a report  which described  al-Qaeda  as  a  ‘net-
work of networks’ with membership  scattered in at least 60 countries. This 
jihad network is also utilizing the internet and other modern technologies as a 
medium in dissemination of messages, individual indoctrination, recruitment 
of  new members,  coordination of activities,  operational  information shar-
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ing, as well as  fundraising and moral support. Their movement can be said 
to be a ‘techno-terrorism’ because it makes use of satellite communications, 
email and the World Wide Web in their action.
This narrative  sees  those facts  as  an irony.  The groups  of ‘Islamic  terror-
ism’ use modern technology in order to pursue the objectives of going back 
to the way of life to the medieval age. Barber, for example, stated that Osama 
Bin Laden without modern media will look like a desert rat that would never 
have been known. His opinion on terrorism without the credit card, the global 
financial system, modern technology and the internet,  the impact will only 
be  like throwing a rock at  the head of a sheikh on the street. At the end of 
its conclusion, the purpose of this narrative construction apparently is to rein-
force the impression of the scope of the danger that may be caused by terrorist 
groups and that to fight them is very difficult and that methods destruction 
and eradication are the only appropriate response in dealing with them.
CLOSING REMARKS
The general characteristics  of the ‘Islamic  terrorism’  related to  the 
narrative  the perpetrators of terrorism are that they exploit a charitable  in-
stitutions as well as other Muslim NGOs to raise funds and divert its use to 
support the  actions  of terrorism. Byman, for example, argued that  the  ‘Is-
lamic terrorists’  are connected to  a broader network  that includes  charita-
ble  institutions  in Chechnya,  organizers of  Islamic education  in Southeast 
Asia, and fundraisers in Europe. Network connection from their NGOs is es-
sential. These NGOs in fact serve as a way for them to raise funds, and they pro-
vide  employment for  the terrorist  activists,  channel  the funds, and provide 
required documents (supporting action). Paul Pillar also identified some Mus-
lim  NGOs  involvement  either  intentionally  or not  in the  event  of terror-
ism. Meanwhile, the Foreign Policy Center said that many Muslim NGO fund-
raisers  turned out to be  terrorist organizations  that escaped the  detection 
of  authorities.  As mentioned earlier,  this type of  narrative  discourse  serves 
to reinforce the concept of the importance of identifying and overseeing Mus-
lim organizations scattered in many places. Although they look normal in ev-
eryday life, the danger they might pose should always be looked out for.
The characteristics of the other narrative are that the ‘Islamic terrorism’ must 
be combated even in the form of concept and idea. Moderate Muslims must 
become a  leading  figure in the fight against  the growing  extreme  prag-
matism  in their environment.  Zeyno  Baran, for example, argued that  the 
central  task  in  counter-terrorism  is to find  formulations  to help  moder-
ate Muslims to win the theological and ideological civil war currently in prog-
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ress against the extremists in the Muslim world. Patricia Hewitt also suggested 
that parties who shoulder the responsibility of leadership must immediate-
ly stand up against any malicious propaganda which are constructed and im-
posed by Islamic extremists in the middle of the Muslim community. This nar-
rative construction at least implies an effort to build understanding of the two 
concepts. First, there is a clear line of separation between the ‘moderate’ Mus-
lims and the ‘extremists’. Second, terrorism generally is an internal issue of the 
Islamic world and it is the responsibility of the Islamic world to fix it.
Other narrative forms are also easy to find in the literature of ‘Islamic terror-
ism’ includes concepts  such as: first, the  ‘Islamic terrorism’ and  ‘extremism’ 
by Muslims living in the middle of the Western societies are due to the lack 
of  integration, failure of multiculturalism, alienation and unemployment as 
well  as  the influence of radicalization of  the Jihad  groups  from the out-
side;  second,  the Muslim communities in  Western countries  are of-
ten  termed  ‘the  fifth  column’ or  the enemy  in the  enemy  within that 
is  either actually or  potentially  very dangerous; third, the ‘Islamic  terror-
ist’ generally consist of young men who are weak and vulnerable psycholog-
ically as well as less educated so that they are easily indoctrinated and brain-
washed. They are easy to fall into extremist propaganda through radicalism in 
the madrasahs, mosques  or  internet sites.  Those involved in the  actions  of 
suicide bombings were allegedly young men who were primarily driven by a 
sense of frustration and sexual impotence.
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